In recent years, Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) has become increasingly important for applications in the industry. Inevitably, security for IIoT has become a priority in order to deploy secure applications. Amongst available cryptographic tools, certificateless signature schemes offer sound authentication solutions and avoid public-key certification from Trusted Third Parties (TTP). Certificateless signatures solve the key escrow problem against the dishonest Private Key Generator (PKG) and has considered to be a useful tool for IIoT applications. Recently, Karati et al. (IEEE Trans. Industrial Informatics, vol.14, no. 8, 2018) presented a lightweight certificateless signature scheme for IIoT Environments. This scheme was then broken by Zhang et al. (IEEE Access, vol. 8, 2018) by simply allowing to change the public key of the signer and using the homomorphic property of the original scheme. In this paper, we introduce a new attack to the scheme against the existential unforgeability, which is universal since we do not have to assume homomorphic property. We then introduce an entirely new lightweight certificateless signature scheme, which has been proven to be fully secure against all attacks found earlier. Our scheme is the first lightweight certificateless signature scheme with full security and is the most efficient in comparison with other existing schemes. It is desirable for IIoT applications. We also provide experimental results to justify our claims.
I. INTRODUCTION
The application of IoT across various industrial sectors is called Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) which enables automation using cloud computing, such as manufacturing, transportation, energy management, smart healthcare, etc. [1] . Compared with the traditional industrial monitoring systems, IIoT increases flexibility and intelligent processes that lower down costs of development and maintenance. While emerging IIoT offers new opportunities, it poses new security threats related to unauthorised data access.
In IIoT, an enormous amount of data collected from different sources is needed to be processed and analysed. Cloud servers are used to ease data exchange and computation between sensors, smart devices and users due to the The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Yinghui Zhang . constrained feature of IIoT devices. For example, cloudassisted IIoT is one of the applications for providing health monitoring [2] . However, cloud data access arises new challenges because data can be accessed, modified or deleted by unauthorised users. Hereby, many authentication protocols and digital signature schemes have been proposed in the literature to ensure data authenticity In addition, energy consumption is an important criteria in designing security protocols for IIoT devices because such security implementations require expensive cryptographic operations. Therefore, it is important to design lightweight and secure cryptographic schemes to reduce energy consumption.
In traditional signature schemes, the binding between a user and his public key is provided by a certificate issued by a trusted third party (TTP) (or certification authority (CA)). To simplify the certificate management process, in 1984, Shamir [3] introduced the notion of identity-based VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ cryptography (IBC) where the user's public key is his identity (such as email address, name, etc.) as some unique information. The first practical identity-based encryption (IBE) was proposed by Boneh and Franklin in 2001 [4] . In their scheme, the TTP or key generation center (KGC) is completely trusted and holds the user's private key which can then generate the secret keys of all its users. It is also a concern that the private keys of users must be distributed over secure channels [5] . Then, the notion of certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) was introduced by Al-Riyami and Paterson [6] in Asiacrypt 2003 to avoid the key-escrow of IBC.
In CL-PKC, certificates are no longer needed for ensuring the authenticity of public keys and therefore the key escrow problem in IBC is alleviated. However, similar to IBC, CL-PKC relies on the existence of a KGC who holds the ''master-key''. To elaborate, KGC does not hold private key of the users, yet it can produce partial private key D i . The partial private key is constructed from the user's identity ID i , and then is transferred to the user i via a secure channel. Consequently, the user i computes his real private key by combining his partial private key D i , some secret information, and the KGC's public parameters to generate his private signing key and the corresponding public verification key.
There are two types of attacks against CL-PKC: Type-I -Key Replacement Attack [7] replaces the user's public key with a chosen value, without having access to D i . The second type of attack (Type-II -Malicious KGC) refers to a KGC who knows D i and impersonates the user, but it does not know the user's secret key or cannot replace the public key [7] , [8] .
In a recent work, Karati et al. [9] introduced a certificateless signature (CLS) scheme for IIoT environments. Unfortunately, it has been broken by Zhang et al. [10] showing that it cannot resist both Type-I and Type-II attacks. Because of the homomorphic property of the CLS scheme of Karati et al., Zhang et al. also showed that it is not existentially unforgeable. In fact, with two valid signatures obtained from signature queries, one can obtain a new signature on a message of m = m i m j , where m i and m j are associated with two different signatures obtained by the adversary but m might not be meaningful to the verifier. They called it ''known message attack''. Zhang et al. also showed that the security proofs of the work proposed by Karati et al. are incorrect.
In this paper, we show that the known message attack can be easily repaired by hashing the message. However, we also found a universal attack against Karati et al.'s signature, even if the known message attack by Zhang et al. has been fixed. Our attack shows that any one who has a valid signature from signature queries can forge a new signature on an arbitrary message; therefore, we call it ''universal attack''. We present an entirely new lightweight CL signature scheme which is secure against all identified attacks and provide completely security proofs. We also carried out an experiment to simulate our scheme and other related schemes and show that our scheme is the most efficient.
II. RELATED WORK
Al-Riami and Paterson [6] introduced the notion of certificateless signature (CLS) and encryption (CLE) in 2005. We refer them as certificateless cryptography (CL-PKC). Since then, several CLS schemes were proposed to improve the original scheme and security models. In [11] , a generic construction of CLS was presented. Kang et al. [12] proposed a CLS scheme based on bilinear pairings and proved its security in the random oracle model assuming that the underlying group is Gap Diffie-Hellman group, to which the security proof is reduced. They borrowed the idea of ID-based signature and BLS signature and created a delegation-bycertificate proxy signature scheme which enables delegation of singing rights. These early works did not consider key replacement attacks.
To improve the CL-PKC scheme, Al-Riyami proposed a new CL-PKC scheme [13] . They provide a generic conversion to obtain a CBE scheme from any secure CL-PKC scheme which improves the original Gentry's CBE scheme [14] . Based on this work, Huang et al. [7] showed that the proposed Al-Riami's CL-PKC is insecure in their security model. The reason is that, an attacker without possessing the master key can launch a public key replacement attack. In the same paper, Huang et al. [7] provided a new CLS scheme to repair the problem. Later, Au et al. [8] presented new CLS security models which assume that the KGC is passive and cannot actively replace the user public key or corrupt the user secret key. They therefore allow a malicious KGC with some conditions. Huang et al. [15] revisited security models of the CLS scheme and proposed new constructions in the random oracle model. The paper introduced three kinds of adversaries, namely Normal Adversary, Strong Adversary, and Super Adversary. However, the proposed scheme by Huang et al. is proved to be universally forgeable by Type-I adversary who can replace users' public keys and generate new signatures under the replaced public keys [16] . To enhance the proposed CLS schemes in real applications (e.g. IoT), several works proposed short CLS schemes (e.g., [17] - [19] ). The idea of the short CLS schemes is to use signature schemes in low-bandwidth communication devices.
Recently, Karati et al. [9] proposed a lightweight certificateless signature scheme for IIoT environments. Unfortunately, it has been broken by Zhang et al. [10] , who showed it is insecure against Type-I attacks and Type-II attacks. Zhang et al. [10] also showed that security proofs in Karati et al. [9] are incorrect. Based on these work we provide a comprehensive analysis and solution to the CLS scheme, which has a special significance to the research and application in IIoT.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a general IIoT scenario that consists of a key generation center (KGC), a cloud sever which provides storage service for IIoT users, a data owner and a data user who is usually not a data owner, magenta and IIoT sensors. The system model of our improved IIoT CLS scheme consists of the following four entities;
• Private Key Generator (KGC): generates system public parameters and partial-private-keys for cloud server and users (data owner and data user).
• Cloud Server: responsible for processing data from data owners. It then communicates with users for data exchange and computation.
• Data Owner: creates certificateless signature (CLS) scheme of his data with his private signing key which is generated with the partial private key received from KGC. The corresponding public key is sent to data user for signature verification. The CLS data is stored on the cloud server and therefore data user retrieves for the verification.
• Data User: receives his partial-private-key from KGC and data owner's public key to verify the CLS scheme.
With the partial private key, he can generate his own private signing key and its corresponding public key. For authentication, he can also sign his communication flows for communication with the cloud. As shown in Figure 1 , in the proposed IIoT system, users are initially needed to be registered with KGC who is considered as a network administrator. The KGC generates and publishes public parameters and partial private keys. Users send their identities for registration to KGC and receive their partial private keys. Then, data owners and data users create their private signing keys and use them for generating CLS of IIoT data. The user's keys are stored on their smart IIoT devices. The IIoT data from IIoT sensors are stored in the cloud server and then collected by the data owner, signed and stored as CLS data. Finally, the stored IIoT data on the cloud can be retrieved by data users and verified with the given data owner's public key.
In the rest of presentation, we revisit and analyse the security of Karati et al.'s scheme and its security issues. Then, we propose an entirely new CLS which offers full security against all identified attacks and present a complete security proof using the standard security model (without random oracles). Because of its lightweightness and security, it can be adopted in our proposed IIoT scenario.
IV. DEFINITIONS A. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G and G T be cyclic group pairs of prime order p and e : G × G → G T be a bilinear mapping with the following properties:
The map e can be computed efficiently.
B. Q-BSDH ASSUMPTION
Let G be an ordered cyclic group of prime order p with generator g. The q-BSDH is stated as follows:
Given as input a (q + 1)-tuple
where the probability is over the random choice of generators g ∈ R G, the random choice of x ∈ R Z p , and the random bits consumed by A. Definition 1 (q-BSDH Assumption): The (q, t, )-BSDH assumption holds in G, if no t-time algorithm has advantage at least in solving the q-BSDH problem in G.
C. FORMAL DEFINITION OF CLS
The formal structure of a CLS scheme consists of the following seven algorithms; 1) (msk, params) ← Setup(λ). Given as input security parameter λ, the algorithm outputs the master key msk and the system public parameters params. 2) D i ← Set-Partial-Private-Key(msk, ID i ). Given as input master key msk and user's identity ID i , the algorithm outputs partial private key D i . 3) x i ← Set-Secret-Value(params, ID i ). Given as input a parameter list params, partial private key D i , the algorithm outputs secret value x i . 4) SK i ← Set-Secret-Key(params, x i , D i ). Given as input public parameters params, the user's partial private key D i and the user's secret value x i , the algorithm outputs a private signing key SK i . 5) Y i ← Set-Public-Key(x i , ID i ). Given as input secret value x i and the user's identity ID i , the algorithm outputs the user's public key Y i . 6) σ ← CLS-Sign(SK i , m). Given as input signer's secret key SK i and message m ∈ {0, 1} * , the algorithm outputs CLS signature σ .
Given as input the public parameters params, the signer's identity ID i , the signer's public key Y i , message m, and signature σ , the algorithm outputs True if the signature σ is valid. Otherwise, it outputs False.
D. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
Type-I: This type of adversary is referred to an adversary A I who does not have access to the master-key, but it has the ability to replace the public key of any user with a value chosen at random. Type-II: This type of adversary is referred to an adversary A II who has access to the master-key, but it does not have the ability to perform public keys replacement.
Definition 2 (Type-I Adversary): A CLS scheme is (t, q pp , q ss , q s , ) Type-I secure under the adaptive chosen message and ID attack, if A I gains a negligible advantage against q pp number of partial private key queries, q ss number of set secret value queries, and q s number of signature queries in polynomial time t in the below game between an adversary A I and a challenger C. is the advantage of A I to forge a signature.
• Setup : The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain system public parameters params and master key msk. Then, C sends params to the adversary A I .
• Partial-Private-Key-Extract : A I requests the partial private key of the user with identity ID i . Then, C outputs D i as the user's partial private key.
• Set-Secret-Value : A I receives the secret value x i of identity ID i from C.
• Set-Secret-Key : A I receives the private key SK i of ID i from C.
• Set-Public-Key : A I receives the public key Y i of ID i from C. 
Definition 3 (Type-II Adversary):
A CLS scheme is (t, q ss , q s , ) Type-II secure under the adaptive chosen message and ID attack, if A II gains a negligible advantage against q ss number of set secret value queries, and q s number of signature queries in polynomial time t in the following game between an adversary A II and a challenger C. is the advantage of A II to forge a signature.
• Setup : The challenger C runs the Setup algorithm to obtain public parameters params and the master key msk. Then C sends params and msk to the adversary A II .
• As in the definition of Type-I adversary, A II makes Partial-Private-Key-Extractqueries,Set-Secret-Value queries, Set-Secret-Key queries, Set-Public-Key queries, and SignQueries.
• Output : Finally, A II outputs a signature σ * on message m * of the user with identity ID * . The message and signature pair (σ * , m * ) must satisfy the following conditions: -A II has not queried Set-Secret-value and Sign of the tuple (ID * , Y * , m * ). -The forged signature σ * is valid under the public key Y * chosen by A II .
V. REVIEW OF KARATI ET AL.'S SCHEME
The proposed CLS scheme in [9] consists of the following six algorithms:
• params ← Setup(λ). Taking as input security parameter λ, KGC outputs system parameters params = G, G T , g 1 , g 2 , e, p, Y KGC , H , where G = g 1 is a group of prime order p generated by g 1 , and a bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T . KGC selects a hash function H : {0, 1} * → Z * p and master secret key msk = y ∈ R Z * p . KGC sets g 2 = e(g 1 , g 1 ) y and public key Y KGC = g y 1 . KGC keeps msk = y as private key and outputs public parameters params. 
Accept the partial private key D i if the following equation holds
. Given public parameters params, user's identity ID i , the algorithm computes the secret key
Given public parameters params and secret value x i , the algorithm returns the user public key Y i as follows:
• σ ← CLS-Sign(prams, SK i , m). Given public parameters params, secret key SK i , and message m ∈ Z * p , it selects t ∈ R Z * p and computes h i , σ 1 , and σ 2 as follows
It outputs signature of message m as σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ).
Given public parameters params, signature σ of message m, the user's identity ID i and public key Y i . Outputs Valid if the following equation holds
Otherwise, outputs Invalid.
VI. OUR ATTACK ON KARATI'S CLS SCHEME
The security model in the work due to Al-Riyami and Paterson [6] captures the existentially unforgeability against Type-I and Type-II adversaries. Zhang et al. [10] showed that the scheme of Karati Here, we show only CLS-Sign algorithm. The rest of the algorithms are same as described in the original scheme in [9] .
CLS-Sign: The adversary received a valid signature σ (m) of ID i in the signature query list from the challenger C where m ∈ Z * p . Ignoring the signature challenge from C, to forge the signature, the adversary A I selects a message m ∈ R Z * p where m = m and m could be the challenge message m * , and then performs the following to compute the forged signature of ID i :
• Compute σ 1 as
• Publish σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) as the forged signature of message m . The attack is successful as it is easy to find that the verification on (σ , Y i ) returns Valid.
Compared with the known message attack, our attack gives a valid signature on any meaningful message, even if the message is hashed before signed. Therefore, the fix to the known message attack cannot be applied to our attack. Actually, our attack can be easily repaired by simply changing m to H (σ 1 , m). However, there are still remaining problems: (1) the key replacement attacks still stand; (2) the scheme cannot be proved due to the challenger cannot answer the signature queries when ID = ID * and m = m * ; (3) the reduction in the proofs is based on the public key, which is entirely wrong. Therefore, their scheme is beyond repairable.
VII. OUR FULLY SECURE LIGHTWEIGHT CLS SCHEME
A. THE SCHEME params ← Setup(λ). Taking as input security parameter λ, KGC outputs system parameters params = G, G T , g, g 1 , e, p, Y KGC , H , where G and G T are multiplicative groups of prime order p, and a bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T . KGC selects a hash functions H : Z p → Z p and H 1 : {0, 1} * → G and the master secret key msk = s ∈ R Z p . KGC's public key is Y KGC = g s . KGC outputs public parameters params.
d i ← Set-Partial-Private-Key(params, msk, ID i ). Taking as input public parameters params, master private key s of KGC, and user's identity ID i . It computes d i = g s i , and Y i1 = g i , where g i = H 1 (ID i ) ∈ R G and is unique for user ID i . d i is the private key for user ID i . Accept, if e(d i , g) = e(g i , Y KGC ) and g i = H 1 (ID i ).
SK ← Set-Secret-Value(ID i ). Given public parameters params, user's identity ID i , it outputs the secret key SK i = x i where x i is chosen at random.
Y i ← Set-Public-Key(x i , ID i ). Given public parameters params, secret value x i and identity ID i , it outputs the user public key
. Given public parameters params, secret key SK i , d i and message M ∈ Z p , it selects R ∈ R Z p and computes
It outputs the signature of message M as σ = (r, S).
Valid/Invalid←CLS-Verify(params, ID i , Y i , m, σ ). Given public parameters params, signature σ of message M , the user's identity ID i and public key, check
The correctness is obvious:
B. SECURITY PROOF
Theorem 1: Suppose the (q, t , )-BSDH assumption holds in G. If there exists a PPT algorithm A I that can break (t, q pp , q ss , q s , )-secure against existential forgery including key replacement with advantage Adv Type-I A I , then there exists a PPT algorithm C that can solve the q-BSDH problem with advantage
where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in G, G T , and Z p . Proof. For simplicity of presentation, we omit the hash function H (). Suppose that there is an adversary A I that can break Type-I security of our proposed CLS scheme. Given the q-BSDH problem instance T = G, g, g x , g x 2 , · · · , g x q , the challenger C uses A I s queries and responses to compute the solution (c, e(g, g)
1 x+c ) of the q-BSDH instance for some known c ∈ R Z * p , c ∈ Z p \{−x} and unknown x ∈ R Z * p where G is a multiplicative group of order p. We assume ID * and m * cannot be queried together by A I .
Consider
The algorithm C proceeds the following game with the adversary A I . Assume ID * i , m * j cannot be queried together by A I . Setup : Challenger C creates a list L = (ID, Y 1 , Y 2 , x, d) that is empty in the beginning. C selects private key s ∈ R Z * p and computes public key Y KGC = g s . C sends public parameters params = (G, G T , e, g, p, Y KGC , H , H 1 ) to A I .
Create-User ID i : C sets h i = H (ID i ) and creates user ID i and add (ID i , * , * , * , * ) to the list L, which initially is empty.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract : A I sends q pp partial private key queries on
Set-Secret-Value : A I sends q ss queries to C. For ID i = ID * if ID i and x i are in the list L, C returns x i . If x i = * , C selects x i ∈ R Z * p as new secret value for ID i and adds (ID i , Y i1 , * , x i , d i ) to the list L. If ID i is not in the list, it calls Create-User to create the new user ID i and adds x i to the list L. If ID i = ID * , C is unable to provide x i and aborts.
Set-Public-Key : A sends q sp queries on a selected ID i to C.
where g x is given in the q-BSDH instance, and updates the list L = (ID i , g * , g x , * , d i ).
Sign-Queries : Adversary A I makes q s signature queries for (ID i , m j ) to C. If ID i = ID * and x i is in the list L, C selects r j ∈ R Z * p and computes a signature easily as follows,
. C outputs the signature σ = (r j , S ij ) and sends it to A I .
If ID i = ID * and m j = m * , where x i = * , C performs the following:
Let f be the univariate polynomial defined as
(X + r i ).
Expand f and write f (X ) = q i=0 α i X i , where α 0 , · · · , α q ∈ Z p are the coefficients of the polynomial f . C picks a random θ ∈ Z p and computes g * = q i=0 A α i ·θ i .
Let f j be the polynomial
We expand f j and rewrite f (X ) = q i=0 α i X i . C then computes
where C has rewritten x as t j · x. Returns σ = (r j , S ij ) as a valid signature on m j .
We can easily find that σ is a valid signature on message m j under the public key Y * 1 = g * , Y * 2 = g x . A I can continue signature queries before returning the forged signature.
Public-Key-Replacement : A I replaces the public key
, and forwards to C.
Forgery : Finally, A I outputs a forged signature σ * = (r * , S * ) for a message m * ∈ {m 1 , · · · , m q } where ID * = ID i with public key Y ID * or Y ID * . If the σ * can be verified with X ID * , A I wins the game and C is unable to solve the q-BSDH problem. However, it is negligible in our game, as a PPT A I is not able to construct a forged signature for any replaced public key Y ID * . The successful forgery should have
The forgery is successful if CLS-Verify (params, m * , σ * , ID * , Y ID * ) outputs Valid, otherwise C aborts.
The correctness: 
where x = t * · x. C uses the long division to compute f (x)/(x + r * ) and computes polynomial f (X ) as f (X ) = (X + r * )γ (X ) + γ * where γ (X ) is a computable polynomial γ (X ) = q−1 i=0 γ i X i and γ * ∈ Z p is a constant. Then, it computes f (X ) as follows:
and can deduce S * from equation (1) as
where γ * = 0. Notice that since f (X ) = q i=1 (X + r i ) and m * / ∈ {m 1 , · · · , m q }, f (X ) cannot be divided by (X + r * ) and therefore C outputs the solution e(g 1 , g 1 ) 1 x+c with the forged S * as follows:
C rewrites W r * = e(g, g) t * /(x +r * ) = e(g, g)
1 x+r * /t * = e(g, g)
1 x+c .
C outputs the solution c, e(g, g) 1 x+c where c = m * /r * , and it then breaks the q-BSDH assumption.
In the following, we perform a probability analysis. For a successful forgery, we consider three events: 1 : C does not abort during the simulation. 2 : S * is a valid forged signature on m * for ID * . 3 : The advantage of A I to forge a signature. The total probability for 1 is
For Forgery, A I outputs a forged signature. If the verification outputs Valid, then the game ends; otherwise C aborts. The probability C does not abort is Pr[ 2 ] = 1/p. Assume the advantage that A I forges a signature successfully is Pr[ 3 ] ≥ . The overall success probability of breaking q-BSDH assumption is:
The advantage of A I breaking the q-BSDH assumption is:
We now compute the time complexity of the game. Let T be the time cost for computing an exponentiation.
For Partial-Private-Key-Extract, C requires q pp T . For Set-Public-Key, C requires q sp T . For SignQueries, C requires (q s + q)T . The total time cost is the sum of these time costs:
The overall time for A I to break the q-BSDH assumption is considered as t ≥ t + (q s + q)T . Theorem 2: Suppose the (q, t , )-BSDH assumption holds in G. If there exists a PPT algorithm A II that can break (t, q pp , q ss , q s , )-secure against existential forgery with advantage Adv A II , then there exists a PPT algorithm C that can solve the q-BSDH problem with advantage
where T is the maximum time for an exponentiation in G, G T , and Z p . Proof. Suppose that there is an adversary A II that can break Type-II security of our proposed CLS scheme. Given the q-BSDH problem instance T = G, g, g x , g x 2 , · · · , g x q , the challenger C uses A II queries and responses to compute the solution (c, e(g, g)
1 x+c ) of the q-BSDH instance for some known c ∈ R Z * p , c ∈ Z p \{−x} and unknown x ∈ R Z * p where G is a multiplicative group of order p. We assume ID * and m * cannot be queried together by A II .
Consider A i = g x i where ∀i ∈ [1, q] . The algorithm C proceeds the following game with the adversary A II . Assume ID * i and m * j cannot be queried together by A II . Setup : Challenger C creates a list
that is empty in the beginning. C selects private key s ∈ R Z * p and computes public key Y KGC = g s .
C sends public parameters
Create-User ID i : C sets h i = H (ID i ) and creates user ID i and add (ID i , * , * , * , * , h i ) to the list L, which initially is empty.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract : A II sends q pp partial private key queries on ID i to C, where ID i = ID * or ID i = ID * . If ID i is not in the list, C calls Create-User for new ID i . C computes d i = g s i , where Y i1 = g i ∈ G is set for ID i only, and adds (ID i , Y i1 , * , * , d i , h i ) to the list L. Otherwise, C returns d i if it is in the list L. If ID i = ID * , C aborts.
Set-Secret-Value : A II sends q ss queries to C. For ID i = ID * if ID i and x i are in the list L, C returns x i . If x i = * , C selects x i ∈ R Z * p as new secret value for ID i and adds (ID i , Y i1 , * , x i , d i , h i ) to the list L. If ID i is not in the list, it calls Create-User to create the new user ID i and adds x i to the list L. If ID i = ID * , C is unable to provide x i and aborts.
Set-Public-Key : A II sends q sp queries on a selected ID i to C.
where g x is given in the q-BSDH instance, and updates the list L = (ID i , g * , g x , * , d i , h i ).
Sign-Queries : Adversary A II makes q s signature queries for (ID i , m j ) to C. If ID i = ID * and x i is in the list L, C selects r j ∈ R Z * p and computes a signature easily as follows,
where t j = H (r j , Y i2 , m j ). C outputs the signature σ = (r j , S ij ) and sends it to A II .
Expand f and write
where α 0 , · · · , α q ∈ Z p are the coefficients of the polynomial f . C picks a random θ ∈ Z p and computes g * = q i=0 A α i ·θ i . Let f j be the polynomial
where C has rewritten x as t · x. Returns σ = (r, S ij ) as a valid signature on m j .
We can easily find that σ is a valid signature on message m j under the public key Y * 1 = g * , Y * 2 = g x . A II can continue signature queries before returning the forged signature.
Forgery : Finally, A II outputs a forged signature σ * = (r * , S * ) for a message m * ∈ {m 1 , · · · , m q } where ID * = ID i with public key Y ID * . The successful forgery should have
where d * is the partial private key for ID * and is held by A II . The forgery is successful if CLS-Verify (params, m * , σ * , ID * , Y ID * ) outputs Valid; otherwise C aborts. The correctness: 
where x = t * · x. C uses the long division to compute f (x)/(x + r * ) and computes polynomial f (X ) as
where γ (X ) is a computable polynomial γ (X ) = q−1 i=0 γ i X i and γ * ∈ Z p is a constant. Then, it computes f (X ) as follows:
and can deduce S * from equation (2) as
Notice that since f (X ) = q i=1 (X + r i ) and m * / ∈ {m 1 , · · · , m q }, f (X ) cannot be divided by (X + r * ) and therefore C outputs the solution e(g, g)
1 x+c with the forged S * as follows:
C II rewrites W t * = e(g, g) t * /(x +r * ) = e(g, g)
C outputs the solution c, e(g, g) 1 x+c where c = r * /t * , and it then breaks the q-BSDH assumption.
In the following, we perform a probability analysis. For a successful forgery, we consider three events: 1 : C does not abort during the simulation. 2 : S * is a valid forged signature on m * for ID * . 3 : The advantage of A II to forge a signature. For Set-Secret-Value, the probability C does not abort is
where 1/p is the probability A II asked the secret value x for user ID * . For SignQueries, we have
The total probability for 1 is
For Forgery, A II outputs a forged signature. If the verification outputs Valid, then the game ends; otherwise C aborts. The probability C does not abort is Pr
Assume the advantage that A II forges a signature successfully is Pr[ 3 ] ≥ . The overall success probability of breaking q-BSDH assumption is: The advantage of A II breaking the q-BSDH assumption is:
For Set-Public-Key, C requires q sp T . For SignQueries, C requires (q s + q)T . The total time cost is the sum of these time costs:
The overall time for A II to break the q-BSDH assumption is considered as
VIII. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Here, we evaluate the efficiency of our CLS scheme and also compare it with the CLS schemes proposed by Karati et al. [9] , Zhang et al. [20] , Huang et al. [15] , Choi et al. [17] , He et al. [21] , Tsai [22] , and Yuan and Wang [23] , in terms of computation time, security type and complexity assumption. We also present details about the experiment, efficiency and signature length of our CLS scheme.
A. RESULTS OF EXPERIMENT
To evaluate the efficiency of our CLS scheme, we preformed implementations with language C coding on a personal computer, Dell Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-8500 CPU @ 3.90-GHz processor, 16 GB RAM, Ubuntu 16.4 LTS, using GNU Multiple Precision Arithmetic (GMP) library and Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library. In Table 1 , we show computation costs of our CLS scheme and the other CLS schemes.
In Table 1 , the computation costs are measured according to the pre-computation costs of operations over bilinear pairings in PBC library. We selected Type-A pairings with 512-b group and embedding degree 2 equals to the 1024-b RSA security level. Type-A pairing is constructed on the super singular elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + x over the field F q where |G| = |G T | = |Z * p | are prime ordered groups of points E(F q ). In the next sub-section, we discuss computational time and signature length of our proposed CLS scheme in detail. 
B. COMPUTATIONAL TIME
In Table 1 , the time cost of signature generation and signature verification are shown according to the time cost of cryptographic primitive operations.
In our CLS scheme, the time cost of Setup algorithm consists of generating a pair of prime ordered group (G, G T ) and one exponentiation. The cost of Set-Partial-Private-Key algorithm and Set-Public-Key algorithm is one exponentiation each. In addition, the signer requires to spend one exponentiation for running CLS-Sign algorithm. The CLS-Verify algorithm requires two exponentiations and one pairing computation in order that the verifier can check the validity of a signature.
The total computation cost of our proposed CLS scheme equals to 5.45ms (Table 1) , which consists of computation costs of running Setup algorithm, Set-Partial-Private-Key algorithm and partial-private-key verification, Set-Secret-Value algorithm, Set-Public-Key algorithm, CLS-Sign algorithm and CLS-Verify algorithm.
As it is presented in Figure 2 , the computation time of our CLS scheme is the lowest among other schemes presented in Table 1 . The unit of y-axis in this figure is milliseconds (ms). Our scheme offers a very short signature size as it is shown in Table 1 and therefore is the most efficient one.
C. SIGNATURE LENGTH
The CLS-Sign algorithm in our proposed CLS scheme is two elements: r ∈ Z p and S ∈ G, which is shorter than that of the VOLUME 7, 2019 proposed CLS scheme by Karati et al. [9] . The CLS-Sign algorithm in [9] generates two tuples and the length of signature is 2|G q |. In addition, the length of signature algorithms in Scheme 1 proposed by Huang et al. [15] , the CLS scheme proposed by Choi et al. [17] , He et al. [21] and Tsai [22] are |G q |, which are also short and efficient. However, the Sign algorithm in the proposed CLS scheme in [20] and [23] are two tuples and three tuples respectively, which are less efficient than our CLS scheme.
IX. CONCLUSION
The emerging Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) can ameliorate productivity, flexibility and save costs in different areas of industry, however it can poses new data security issues, particularly authentication. In this paper, we analysed the security of the certificateless signature scheme (CLS) for IIoT proposed in [9] . We showed that the scheme is universally forgeable under chosen message attacks. This can make the scheme insecure under their defined adversarial models of Type-I and Type-II. We proposed an entirely new scheme that resists Type-I and Type-II adversaries. Our CLS scheme is the first lightweight scheme that can be proved with a very tight security reduction and is computationally efficient in comparison with other existing schemes. In order to show the computational efficiency of our proposed CLS scheme, we simulated our scheme and measured the time complexity. As a result, our CLS scheme is more secure and lightweight than other existing schemes and therefore more suitable for IIoT applications.
